Fact Sheet: Ways to Develop the Internal Structures of Civil Organizations and Build Their Capacities in Facing Crises


Civil society organizations of all sectors responded to face with the emergency state enforced by the COVID-19 pandemic. Every sector responded according to its capabilities to reduce the virus's adverse effects as much as possible.

The interaction and adaption of Civil Society Organizations with the pandemic spreading in the Strip revealed a variation in their capabilities needed to respond to the crisis and challenges. This would require much greater resources due to the complexities of the political and social atmosphere, including restrictions created as a result of the ongoing political division, in addition to declining funding and conditions set by donors and sponsors.

The pandemic also led many civil society organizations to review their internal structures and enhance their administrative and logistical capacity in connection with their ability to respond to disasters and crises.

Civil society organizations' internal structure generally includes three central bodies, the general assembly, the board of directors, and the executive staff.

Its vision and mission are to clarify the mechanisms of communication between employees' different levels and decision-making and policymaking, which contributes to providing an environment of good management within the institution by offering control and accountability tools.

In terms of drawing up organizations' general policies, it is among the board of directors' powers that has the confidence and full authorization from the General Assembly to distribute tasks to the executive staff and manage all institution materials, whether human, information, or organizational. The board of directors must also involve the staff in developing emergency plans and following up on their implementation.

Civil society organizations facts and data:

• The number of civil society organizations operating in the Gaza Strip reached 1033 NGOs, including 913 local organizations and 119 foreign organizations, which means that 11.5 percent of the organizations conducting in the Gaza Strip are foreign (international), compared to 88.5 percent are local organizations.[1]

• Civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip operate in a highly complex legal environment, especially with the safety procedures and practices. Adding insult to injury, the ongoing political split causes dual patterns in Ramallah and the Gaza Strip, complicating the situation even more. Renewing boards of directors, for example, opening of bank accounts, or other restrictions[2]. Adding to that, the Israeli occupation enforces more obstacles, which leaves the Palestinian reality with more inflammatory campaigns and less international funding. This leaves the work of organizations exclusive to emergencies, mainly that some donors imposed new financial restrictions.[3]

• The accumulated past experiences of civil society organizations operating in the Gaza Strip contributed to facing crises through the flexibility they showed in adapting their programs and activities to respond to the existing challenge. The fantastic ability was gained after dealing with the unexpected violations of the Israeli authorities.

• Civil society organizations and their working teams have been characterized by efficiency, vitality, and sufficient flexibility in dealing with the crisis, despite the fragility they suffer from due to a set of limiting policies that hinder their development. The worsening situations grew out of politics to reach funding and management, as in bank accounts and procedures for approving boards of directors.

• It is not possible to talk about contingency plans in dealing with this type of crisis. Civil organizations deal with the pandemic's challenges based on organizations' flexibility and their willingness to face troubles, more than what are pre-prepared plans for this type of crisis.[4]

• The crisis revealed the gap that exists between civil organizations and official bodies concerning coordination and networking. To be more specific, in light of the non-involvement of civil organizations in managing the crisis.

• The COVID-19 pandemic has led many civil organizations to adopt virtual means of communication between their various bodies, the board of directors, for instance, and the institution's executive body to implement the required modifications to activities and programs in line with the existing problematic situation. This indicates the levels of flexibility within these organizations, which enable them to respond to required adjustments and actions rapidly.

• The fact that the virus did not spread inside the Gaza Strip and was limited to quarantine centers established by the existing authorities helped to give civil organizations the opportunity and sufficient time to make adjustments to plans, programs, and projects to make the necessary adjustments and precautions to avoid stopping their services.

• The existing variation in responding to the catastrophes between civil society sectors is due to several factors related to the size of the funding available to the institutions, and the donor's consent to make adjustments to the activities and programs by the organization that are compatible with the needs resulting from the pandemic.

• Civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip carried out many interventions and activities in various fields like health, social, and culture, to raise awareness regarding confronting the pandemic. In the same context, field sector NGOs implemented many initiatives and awareness campaigns about pandemic prevention, providing sterilizers, providing direct health care for elderly patients or those with chronic diseases, and supporting the poor and needy from marginalized groups. Also, they helped in equipping quarantine centers with the required logistics and providing ministries with what equipment that guarantees a proper quarantine. [5]

• The report of the OCHA Office indicated that nearly $ 42 million is needed to repair Corona damages. The report pointed out that the Gaza Strip's need to confront the pandemic amounts to about $ 12,477.962 million of the total funding required; however, 23 million dollars were funded, about 51% of the amount necessary to face the disease in sectors such as food security, education, shelters, health, nutrition, and protection.[6]

• It is noteworthy that the UN Humanitarian Pool Fund (HPF) provided funding to NGOs during the years 2018 and 2019, with 25 percent of the total grants and aid supplied to the occupied Palestinian territories, since the Turkey World Summit in 2016. The outcome of such a helping gesture was the agreement on the necessity of disbursing this percentage of grants and funding to civil organizations.[7]

The First Area of Focus: The Reality of Work Under COVID-19 Threat

The pandemic has created a set of measures posed as obstacles in front of civil society organizations' work. These obstacles tested the extent of their readiness and ability to respond immediately to emergencies. This is due to several reasons related to the capabilities of the organization and its working staff, the nature of the target group, the volume of funding, the relationship with the donor, and the extent of his understanding of the need to make adjustments or changes in response to the existing situation.

Preparedness and Response:

There are many observations that civil organizations of all sectors and fields relied upon response and preparedness to confront the pandemic:

• The decisions made by the Ministry of Interior regarding limiting gatherings in public places and markets and closing mosques and civil organizations and adopting virtual means of communication between the various bodies within the civil organization. Through these alternative means, communication can lead to making required adjustments to activities and programs and the necessary amendments for Emergency plans for NGOs according to their sector.

• Civil society organizations have begun to develop communication tools and adapt many programs and activities to the situation generated by the virus, and some civil organizations have distributed powers to the executive management in the framework of giving sufficient flexibility in the ability to respond to the emerging challenges.[8]

• The emergency plans prepared to deal with disasters were not compatible with the emergency developments caused by the Coronavirus pandemic's precautionary measures.

• The weak capacities of small civil organizations, small organizations in marginalized geographical areas, reflected poorly on their readiness since massive civil organizations' involvement in providing services is almost non-existent. During the pandemic, the need for such grassroots organizations increased; however, their performance was as expected due to the insufficient resources and lack of experience.[9]

• The lack of virtual experiences of civil society organizations and the lack of adequate alternative means expose Gaza's digital gap in terms of bad internet connection and power outages more.[10]

• Some civil organizations have demonstrated a response in facing the Corona calamity. They maintained their services and their employees, whether working full or part-time. These organizations depended on their experience by adapting their activities and programs in line with the pandemic response mechanisms. Hence, they have implemented many awareness-raising initiatives for the public about pandemic prevention, as in the health and agricultural sectors. The women's sector has also made initiatives on domestic and gender-based violence during the spread of Corona. The education sector did not stand motionless; it carried out initiatives about remote learning. Other civil society organizations provided aid to the authorities in charge of delivering the required logistics[11] in quarantine centers of all kinds, including beds, bedding, and foodstuffs, which helped control the quarantine centers' cases.

• Some organizations, on the other hand, have stopped providing their services ultimately, due to the nature of the services they provide, which necessarily require direct communication with the beneficiaries. Education and rehabilitation sectors, for example, are inconsistent with precautionary measures, which made this sector specifically unable to meet the needs of the exceptional cases like persons with disabilities. The Corona pandemic made these sectors relinquish their continuity in the assistance they deliver.[12]

As for the education sector, its practical courses were disrupted and were carried over to after the crisis, meaning that the technical and vocational track was more damaged than the academic one. The damages were not because of the shortcomings of civil organizations in terms of response and readiness, as much as it is related to the necessity of commitment to measures and strengthening preventive culture as the most effective means in facing the current problematic reality.

Levels of Decision Making During the Pandemic:

First: The decision-making process is the cornerstone of the work of any organization, and it means choosing one of the available alternatives on practical and objective grounds, and within the agreed principles and standards of the organization.[13]

Second: The decision-making process in NGOs in the Gaza Strip passes through several levels. The first is the administrative level associated with a board of directors that draws up policies and clarifies the interventions required to achieve the institution's mission and goals. On the other hand, the executive staff is entrusted with making the necessary decisions to implement these policies and usually refer to the executive director's board of directors in taking essential and vital decisions in regular and emergency times.

Third: The decision-making process during the Corona pandemic witnessed high flexibility in the relationship between the administrative and executive bodies. Due to the inability to hold face-to-face meetings, NGOs turned towards holding meetings and consultations through remote communication techniques using the Internet or phone. NGOs directors and their board of directors have used these means to maintain the work of their organizations.[14]

Drawing Policies and Carrying Out Necessary Interventions During the Pandemic:

Some NGOs, through flexible policies and interventions, reflected their inability to hold face-to-face meetings between the board of directors to adopt appropriate plans and programs for their work during the ongoing uncertain times and to give responsibilities to the executive council to take the needed decisions and actions relevant to the size of the existing problem.

Coordination was present between the two bodies, despite that it was sometimes limited to the chairman of the board of directors and the executive director of the civil organization to draw up the required interventions in some cases, without referring to the entire board of directors, as happens in the normal situation.

This should be viewed, not as a monopoly on the role of the executive body in adopting policies and drawing interventions, but as the organization's high flexibility and effective response to facing emergencies, without addressing bureaucratic procedures that may require a long time, which is not available to all organizations facing the pandemic.

Therefore, the speedy response in drawing up the interventions required for facing Corona's challenges was the executive body's responsibility to facilitate the work of organizations. Their duty is vital because the processes of adapting programs and activities and undertaking voluntary initiatives and campaigns are not random, nor are they arbitrary. They are based on the expectations, and urgent needs of Palestinians resulted from the pandemic.

Feminist organizations, for example, focused their interventions in the form of initiatives to provide psychological and social support to marginalized groups, women in particular, as they are the most vulnerable and affected group in society due to the pandemic, especially with expectations of high rates of domestic and gender-based violence because of the lockdown state, which reflects negatively on families in the Gaza Strip.[15]

Those organizations relied on adapting their programs to serve the new challenge, with many other usual programs being suspended and postponed in response to the existing challenge.[16]

The organizations operating in the health sector faced a different challenge that imposed itself on the reality of work, the necessity for the continuation of their services to the public on the one hand, and the need to educate the public about prevention measures the other hand. That required them to take a set of rapid steps with which their work priorities changed to become the safety culture an achieved goal before continuing to provide regular health services.

The youth and cultural sector relied on the digital environment to communicate with its audience, harmonized all the activities, in line with the achievement of the goals, and had sufficient flexibility to replace face-to-face meetings through the excellent employment of the digital means. In this context, many awareness initiatives were implemented by self-efforts to educate society on virus and prevention methods.[17]

Levels of Ability to Coordinate and Network:

The pandemic revealed coordination and networking problems among NGOs, whether at the coordination level with governmental institutions (ministries) or the level of cooperation and networking among them.

1- At the level of coordination and networking with government institutions:

Despite the absence of civil society organizations by government agencies to develop and draw the emergency plan to confront the Corona pandemic, some government agencies[18] have resorted to them and benefit from their services and equipping quarantine centers the government request[19]. Civil society organizations provided as many logistical services as possible to the Ministry of Social Development in Gaza.

2- At the level of coordination between civil organizations in the same sector:

Several challenges emerged at the relationship between civil organizations with a single sector, as competition for funding is reflected coordination between civil organizations.[20]

3- On the other hand, this cannot be applied to all NGOs; some civil organizations held more than one coordination meeting to cooperate in providing services, and they established an emergency group to exchange experiences among themselves.[21] Their goal was to overcome the virus crisis; however, these successes are limited to small numbers of organizations, usually, organizations with increased funding and capabilities than grassroots ones. This can be referred to as coordination and networking when needed, which contradicts the partnership's genuine concept.

The Second Area of Focus: The Reality of Self-Financing Opportunities Within NGOs And the Most Prominent Challenges in Crisis Times

International funding plays an influential role in civil organizations' work in the Gaza Strip and their ability to cope with crises and disasters. It is much reflected in the creation of organizations, their programs and projects, and their ability to provide help and aid.[22]

The reality of civil society organizations in Palestine is apparent to any keen observer regarding the finical and funding problem that existed before the health pandemic. This has led the organizations to postpone projects and direct efforts to develop alternative plans.

Major activities were also canceled, resulting in a significant financial loss, and funds were redirected from planned activities to timely responses to the pandemic, which require flexibility in the use of grants.[23]

The pandemic doubled civil organizations' work crises due to the halt of work and the prevention of public meetings, which led to a decline in services' effectiveness and imposed on them to work with the minimum of their capabilities.

Doners had different opinions and positions. Some understood the reality and agreed to make adjustments to activities, programs, and projects in response to the pandemic, while others called for postponing the implementation of projects until everything comes back to normal.[24] Nevertheless, a group of donors demanded that projects and programs be stopped during the home lockdown, which was reflected in NGOs' ability to continue their work and the payroll of employees.[25]

The non-governmental organizations operating in the rehabilitation sector of persons with disabilities are considered the most affected sectors. This is due to the high cost needed by rehabilitation processes for people with disabilities, especially in light of their inability to provide emergency self-financing to confront the pandemic. In that way, they can continue providing their services to the public.[26]

As for the Palestinian private sector's role in providing funding to NGOs, NGOs emphasized that there are apparent deficiencies that the private sector suffers from in this aspect and that social responsibility necessitated the private sector to provide the support that would help these organizations to continue providing their services.[27]

In addition to this, international organizations operating in the Gaza Strip compete with NGOs for funding sources to provide services to the public. Instead of enabling NGOs to obtain appropriate funding, these international organizations work to exclude NGOs outside the circle and monopolize financing alone. [28]

In this context, the pandemic revealed the need for civil organizations to think carefully about searching for real alternatives to external financing, which requires, in one form or another, a return to the roots[29], through relying on self-resources, reconsidering voluntary work, adopting emancipatory development in its real sense, and getting rid of the dependency of funders and their requirements.

In this context, it is imperative to adopt a share of the general budget[30] within the system of good management to support civil organizations in times of disasters and invoke fundamental roles for the private sector, which must assume its social responsibilities in helping society to cope with its challenges.

The Third Area of Focus Is Applying Emergency Plans Within Civil Organizations in Crisis Management

• In light of the surprise created by the Corona pandemic, the emergency plans, previously adopted and prepared by civil organizations, were not suitable for facing this type of crisis, as the pandemic was more significant than expectations.

• The contingency plans were not effective in meeting the challenge, which forced NGOs to make short-term adjustments to the agenda until the end of this year (2020), in response to the pandemic.[31]

• Determining the emergency plans' needs came as a quick procedure due to the precautionary measures imposed by the pandemic and the urgent need for a speedy response.

• Some civil society organizations have had to make three changes to their emergency plan, in a way that responds to the different scenarios for the development of the pandemic, whether as a controlled threat, a general uncontrolled threat, or a curfew situation. These amendments were made in coordination with the boards of directors and left the powers in the executive council's hands to make the necessary adjustments. This was done under the lack of time during an emergency, which did not give the organization the luxury of discussion.

The Fourth Area of Focus: Lessons and Results

• The Corona pandemic revealed the urgent need, in one way or another, to seriously develop the internal structures of civil organizations in the Gaza Strip and build their capacities in facing crises. The inequality of responses put on display the possibilities of creating structures and strengthening abilities and establishing a specialized department under the name of emergency response.

• The pandemic revealed the need for civil organizations to face the dropping of external funding and its requirements to return to independence in creating self-financing opportunities that enable them to continue their services to the public. This need emerged from the fact that some civil organizations in their work on a sole external doner[32] limit their effectiveness without any local sources of funding. This problem's results are reflected in the cutting specific programs off due to the withdrawal of doners or suspension of funds. 

• Not involving civil organizations within the Higher Committee for Confronting the Pandemic demonstrated an imbalance in coordination and networking with the government sector and the presence of restrictions and complications placed by government agencies in the face of NGOs' work.

• The need to establish a specialized unit in logistical work to provide the necessary logistical needs to deal with the crisis. Consequently, readiness keeps being in a renewable state for NGOs to play their role in all circumstances effectively.

• The need for an integrated strategy capable of reducing the gap in food security in the Gaza Strip, since the percentage of food security deficiency exceeds 70 percent, while more than 80 percent of the Gaza Strip population depends on humanitarian aid.[33] According to this, cooperation with official bodies and international organizations should direct policies to support food security.

• There is a need to strengthen civil organizations' role in influencing government policies, and not to lose sight of the various other aspects imposed by the pandemic.

• The need to develop the NGO law in a way that guarantees the right to form associations.  NGOs face many legal challenges due to the absence of legal legislation, the vague or restrictive nature of legislation or its implementing regulations, or the government's hostility towards it and intrusion on its work.

• This is one of the most prominent reasons that limit the development of civil organization structures during crises, particularly in the ongoing political split and the strict procedures imposed by the executive authority on the work of civil organizations, which includes the renewal of boards of directors, bank accounts, and other restrictive measures.

• Restrictions imposed on the right to form NGOs should be abolished and exempting them from taxes. The Monetary Authority and banks must freeze the accounts of some associations; instead, they should empower them to fulfill their national role in providing services marginalized groups to rise against Israeli violations.

The Fifth Area of Focus: Recommendations for Developing Work Within Civil Organizations to Enhance Their Role in Facing Disasters and Crises:

• Activating relationships between all bodies within the civil society organization's structure to adopt the horizontal network structures instead of the vertical. This is to ensure real and influential roles, especially for the General Assembly, involve them in drawing up its plans and directions, and not be satisfied with its formal presence in times of renewal of boards of directors or approval of the financial and administrative reports only.

• Establishing a unit under the Emergency Response Department's name, which includes in its membership representatives of various levels in civil organizations. Its prominent role is to deal with the challenges and repercussions of disasters and crises that give the civil organization greater effectiveness and higher efficiency in those situations.

• Including the civil organization's strategic plan in "The Emergency Department," as one of its tasks should be to train workers, executive crews, and volunteers to work in times of crises and disasters, and professionally prepare them to deal with it.

• Strengthening the role of civil organizations in decision-makers' societal accountability, whether governmental bodies or international institutions.


• Enhancing the civil organizations 'ownership of an effective communication and communication system to convey the desired image, and providing information and data to stakeholders would encourage the private sector to play more significant roles in supporting NGOs and assuming its social responsibilities.

• Including the organizational structures and structures of the HR development unit that meets the organization's needs of employees and training programs to develop performance, especially creating the organizations' marketing capabilities to enhance the organization's overall image in the eyes of the public.

• Reconsidering the policy of investing funds granted by donors to achieve sustainability among the beneficiaries, and supporting the internal resources that organizations have in projects that provide them with self-support such as (small projects - revolving loan fund ... etc.).

• Modernizing and investing in the technological infrastructure to develop institutions digitally and enhance their availability according to precise standards. It is also crucial to establish a system of documentation and computerization of processes and information that allows an enhancing flow between organizational units through technical means that facilitate the process.

• Adopting supportive policies by NGO management to implement strategic plans and implement it during crises flexibly and comprehensively in all areas of its work.

• Working to create a system for exchanging information between NGOs, and owning an updated database in various sectors to facilitate the design of policies, interventions, and complementarity in performance.

• Raising the coordination and networking levels among all civil organizations by establishing a qualitative union to coordinate between them, which includes especially those working in the field of community protection, crisis, and disaster management.

• Re-evaluating many civil society organizations' internal structure, enhancing their capabilities with scientific skills and knowledge in implementation, and ensuring that their working crews possess the necessary skills during the emergency period.

• Preparing a joint program for building the capacities of civil organizations, which includes practical training on disaster and crisis management and training on implementing emergency plans. The training would also enhance their capabilities in the administrative aspects of procurement and logistical support and create policies that enable institutions to work efficiently during crises.

• Setting emergency plans according to scientific studies that present a map of action during the crisis and the implementation policies to be followed, building needs according to the challenge and the facts imposed on the ground, and involving boards of directors and general assemblies in their preparation process.

• Establishing a joint plan between the different sectors, so that the organizations operating in each industry participate in drawing up the plan, training the staff and workers on it, and developing the skills of institutions, for the sake of complementarity in performance.




1- Ihab halo: “A proposed vision for developing the institutional capacity building in civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip,” Master Thesis, Academy of Graduate Studies and Policies, Joint Program with Al-Aqsa University, Gaza, 2016.

2- “NGO Network Statement,” https://www.maannews.net/news/2002088.html

3- Bakr al-Turkman: “Restrictions on the Right to Form NGOs”, a paper presented at a workshop organized by the Independent Commission for Human Rights, “The Reality of the Work of NGOs,” Gaza, 6/18/2020

4- Hazem Al-Namlah: “Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations from a Political Economy Perspective, An Intervention from a Global Domination Perspective”, published MA thesis, Birzeit University, 2008.

5- Khalasi Murad: “Decision-making in the Management of Human Resources and Stability of Frameworks at Work,” Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research - University of Mentouri, (2006/2007 AD), pp. 78-76.

6- PNGO: “Civil Society Response in the Face of the Corona Crisis in Palestine”, monthly newsletter, Gaza, 1st issue, March 2020


7- Addameer Foundation for Human Rights: “The right to form association in accordance with Palestine's international obligations,” 2019.

8- Nader Saeed: The Sustainability Agenda for Civil Society Organizations, Institute for Development Studies, p. 5 Birzeit University, 2015.

9- Ma'an Agency: PNGO Statement, https://www.maannews.net/news/2002088.html

10- Al-Zaytouna Center for Strategic Studies: “The strategic report (2018-2019).

11- Ministry of Interior website: https://ngo.moi.gov.ps

12- The focus group: It was organized in PNGO, on Thursday 4/6/2020

13- The Humanitarian Country Team: " OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY COVID-19 Response Plan”, OCHA, 24 April 2020

14. Occupied Palestinian territory 2020 (part of 2018-2020 HRP) (Humanitarian response plan) https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/832/summary



15- Bassam Abu Hashish, university lecturer at Al-Aqsa University on: 3/6/2020

16- Taghreed Jumaa: Union of Palestinian Women's Committees, on 6/17/2020

17- Tayseer Muheisen: Development Researcher, Agricultural Relief, on 6/11/2020

18- Jaber Kodeih: Ma'an Development Center, on 6/17/2020

19- Mohsen Abu Ramadan: Hayder Abdul Shafi and Development Center, on 6/17/2020

20- Mustafa Ibrahim, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, on 3/6/2020

21- Yousri Darwish: Federation of Cultural Centers, on: 6/17/2020




[1] Ministry of Interior website: https://ngo.moi.gov.ps/

[2] Bakr al-Turkman: “Restrictions on the Right to Form NGOs”, a paper presented at a workshop organized by the Independent Commission for Human Rights, “The Reality of the Work of NGOs,” Gaza, 6/18/2020

[3] Addameer Foundation for Human Rights: “The right to form association in accordance with Palestine's international obligations,” 2019.


[4] - Tayseer Muheisen: Agricultural Relief, interview, Wednesday 11/6/2020

[5] - PNGO: “The Civil Society’s Response to the Coronavirus Crisis in Palestine,” (monthly bulletin), Issue 1, March 2020, http: //pngoportal.org/news/20296.htm

[6] The Humanitarian Country Team: " OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY COVID-19 Response Plan", OCHA, 24 April 2020.


[7] Occupied Palestinian territory 2020 (part of 2018-2020 HRP) (Humanitarian response plan)


[8] Taghreed Jumaa: Union of Palestinian Women's Committees, interview on 6/17/2020

[9] Jabr Quideh: Previous reference

[10] Taghreed Jumaa: Previous reference

[11] Mustafa Ibrahim, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, interview at the Commission’s headquarters, Wednesday 6/3/2020

[12] The outcomes of the focus group gathering organized at PNGO, Thursday 4/6/2020

[13] Khalasi Murad: “Decision-making in the Management of Human Resources and Stability of Frameworks at Work,” Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research - University of Mentouri, (2006/2007 AD), pp. 78-76.

[14] Jabr Quideh: previous reference

[15] Previous reference

[16] Mustafa Ibrahim, interview on 3/6/2020

[17] The outcomes of the focus group gathering: Pervious reference

[18] Taghreed Jumaa: Previous reference

[19] Jabr Quideh: Previous reference

[20] Jabr Quideh: Previous reference

[21] Jabr Quideh: Previous interview

[22] Taghreed Jumaa: Previous interview

[23] Ma'an website: "PNGO Statement", https://www.maannews.net/news/2002088.html

[24] The outcomes of the focus group gathering: Previous reference

[25] Bassam Abu Hashish, interview on 3/6/2020

[26] The outcomes of the focus group gathering: Previous reference

[27] Mustafa Ibrahim, previous reference

[28]  The outcomes of the focus group gathering: Previous reference

[29] Tayseer Muheisen: Previous reference

[30] Mohsen Abu Ramadan: Previous reference

[31] The outcomes of the focus group gathering: Previous reference

[32] Nader Saeed: The Sustainability Agenda for Civil Society Organizations, Institute for Development Studies, pp. 5 Birzeit University, 2015,

[33] Al-Zaytoonah Center for Strategic Studies: “The Strategic Report” (2018-2019)

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